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The signal is the truth. The noise is what distracts us from the truth. This is a book 
about the signal and the noise. 
 
Nate Silver, The Signal and the Noise: The Art and Science of Prediction (London: Penguin, 2013). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
There has been an unfortunate trend in recent Supreme Court of Canada 
administrative law cases.1  
 
While academics, practitioners and lower-court judges try to establish 
coherent frameworks to understand the general principles of judicial review, the 
Court has been resolving cases one by one without, with respect, any serious attempt 
to explain how they fit into its existing body of administrative law jurisprudence. 
The institutional context in which the Court operates, explained in Part I, no doubt 
influences the Court’s resolution of individual cases in this way. 
Whatever the background institutional context, confusion has been the unfortunate 
result, as I explain in Part II. How should lawyers read these cases: as attempts to 
resolve one-off issues of substantive law (workers’ compensation law, immigration 
law, discrimination law and so on) or as continual refinements to an already complex 
body of administrative law doctrine?  
 
I argue that it is now necessary to distinguish between signal and noise, 
between those cases that do modify administrative law doctrine and those cases that 
simply deal with a particular substantive area of law. In Part III, I set out criteria 
which will help Canadian administrative lawyers to distinguish signal from noise.  
 
This confusion seems to me, however, to be unnecessary. As I suggest in Part 
IV, the Court could take up judicial and academic proposals for a unified 
                                                 
* Senior Lecturer in Public Law, University of Cambridge; Derek Bowett Fellow in Law, Queens’ 
College, Cambridge; Research Associate, Centre de recherche en droit public. A previous version was 
delivered as the Keynote Address to the Law Society of Upper Canada’s 24th Annual Immigration Law 
Summit, November 23, 2016 and to the Administrative Law Section, Prince Edward Island branch, of the 
Canadian Bar Association on December 14, 2016. Thanks, with the usual disclaimer, to participants at 
both events and the anonymous reviewers for their penetrating comments and insights. Some of the 
material in this article appeared originally on my blog, Administrative Law Matters. 
 
1 My focus here is on the period from 2008 to the present day. I have read all of the Supreme Court of 
Canada’s administrative law output since Dunsmuir v New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 SCR 190 
[Dunsmuir] and a significant proportion of the post-Dunsmuir case law produced by the lower courts. I 
appreciate that some of my comments may seem impressionistic. The concerned reader can rest assured 
that I opine from a solid knowledge base. 
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reasonableness standard that would allow it to resolve individual cases without 
creating uncertainty about whether it has also modified administrative law doctrine. 
Adopting this approach would obviate the need to distinguish signal from noise, 
because they would both fade into the comforting hum of reasonableness review. 
 
 
I. Institutional Context 
 
The problem of distinguishing signal from noise must be understood in context.  
 
The Court is an apex court, sitting athwart Canada’s judicial hierarchy. 
With the exception of certain criminal cases where there is an automatic right of 
appeal, the Court deals only with questions of “public importance”, important legal 
questions and other questions “of such a nature or significance as to warrant [its] 
decision”.2 
 
Moreover, its decisions are important not only for the parties that appear 
before it but also for the wider community: the reasons it gives lay down important 
guidance for lower courts, litigants and laypeople. 
 
The Court itself is aware of this. In R v Henry,3 Binnie J explained that the 
traditional common law distinction between ratio decidendi – those matters essential 
to the decision of a case – and obiter dicta – everything else – was a “supposed 
dichotomy” that is an “oversimplification of how the common law develops”.4 
Rather: 
 
The issue in each case…is what did the case decide?  Beyond the ratio 
decidendi which…is generally rooted in the facts, the legal point decided 
by this Court may be as narrow as the jury instruction at issue in [Sellars v 
The Queen, [1980] 1 SCR 527] or as broad as the Oakes test.  All obiter do 
not have, and are not intended to have, the same weight.  The weight 
decreases as one moves from the dispositive ratio decidendi to a wider 
circle of analysis which is obviously intended for guidance and which 
should be accepted as authoritative.  Beyond that, there will be 
commentary, examples or exposition that are intended to be helpful and 
may be found to be persuasive, but are certainly not “binding” in the sense 
the Sellars principle in its most exaggerated form would have it.  The 
objective of the exercise is to promote certainty in the law, not to stifle its 
growth and creativity.  The notion that each phrase in a judgment of this 
Court should be treated as if enacted in a statute is not supported by the 
cases and is inconsistent with the basic fundamental principle that the 
common law develops by experience.5 
                                                 
2 Supreme Court Act, RSC 1985, c s-26, s 40(1).  
 
3 R v Henry 2005 SCC 76, [2005] 3 SCR 609 [Henry]. 
 
4 Ibid at para 52. 
 
5 Ibid at para 57. 
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The result, though, is that even if the decisions of the Court are not treated as 
legislative pronouncements, there is a temptation to closely parse obiter statements 
for indications of changes in the law. The question is no longer “is this part of the 
ratio?” but rather “is this authoritative?” 
 
The undoubted need to give general guidance is also a reason for enhanced 
collegiality on an apex court. It has been said that under the stewardship of 
McLachlin CJ, the Court has placed a premium on collegiality and the production of 
majority and even unanimous reasons.6 This can increase certainty and clarity by 
committing all members of the Court to the same position. But it can also undermine 
certainty and clarity by achieving a narrow unified position at the cost of drowning 
out dissenting noises that may prove too loud to ignore in later cases.7 
 
 
II. Signal or Noise? 
 
A problem that can be traced to the institutional context in which the Supreme Court 
of Canada operates plagues the Canadian law of judicial review of administrative 
action. Because of the Court’s role in answering important questions of law, it is 
often difficult to determine whether the reasons given for deciding a judicial review 
case are intended to have an effect on the general principles of administrative law.  
Administrative law consists of general principles that have to be applied to different 
areas of substantive law. Decisions in environmental law, discrimination law, 
workers’ compensation law, immigration law and so on are, where taken by 
administrative decision-makers, subject to judicial review for legality, rationality and 
fairness.8 These general principles exist at one remove from the substantive law that 
provides the context in which administrative decisions are taken. 
 
As a result, the Court may grant leave to appeal (and may eventually decide 
a case) for one of two reasons: it may wish to answer a question or questions relating 
to the general principles of judicial review; it may wish to answer a question of 
substantive law; some combination of the two is also possible. Although reasons for 
granting or denying leave are not given, my experience is that the Court is much 
more interested in questions of substantive law than questions relating to the general 
principles of judicial review.  
 
Indeed, as the judicial body of last resort, the Court has to give authoritative 
guidance on matters of substantive Canadian law to other actors (individuals, 
politicians, lawyers and lower-court judges), a task that might be impeded by 
consideration of the general principles of judicial review. According deference to 
                                                 
6 See e.g. Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 52 
SCLR (2d) 379. 
 
7 For a generalized critique of the demise of seriatim opinions, see Dyson Heydon, “Threats to Judicial 
Independence: the Enemy Within” (2013) 129 Law Q Rev 205. 
 
8  Canada (AG) v TeleZone Inc, 2010 SCC 62 at para 24, [2010] 3 SCR 585. 
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administrative decision-makers, for instance, means favouring legal pluralism, 
permitting those decision-makers to put their own spin on rules of substantive and 
procedural law. But as court of final resort, the Court has an institutional obligation 
to set down clear substantive and procedural rules for courts and decision-makers 
across the country. 
 
Few of the judicial review cases the Court agrees to hear provide 
meaningful guidance to lower courts on how to apply the general principles of 
administrative law. Sometimes the Court ignores the role of the administrative 
decision-maker entirely – Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),9 which 
involved an important question of immigration law touching upon the interpretation 
of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees is an example; 
sometimes it dresses up its authoritative exposition of the law in the guise of 
reasonableness review – so-called “disguised correctness review”, in which it says it 
is applying a reasonableness standard but in fact performs its own analysis of the law 
and the facts to reach an independent conclusion that it labels ‘reasonable’ or 
‘unreasonable’10; and sometimes in its drive for coherence it undermines legal 
pluralism.11 The techniques are not mutually exclusive, of course, and they are often 
deployed in combination. 
 
These techniques might permit the Court to provide authoritative guidance 
on important questions of substantive law, but their use raises inevitable questions 
about their impact on the general principles of judicial review. When the Court 
ignores administrative law, engages in disguised correctness review, or otherwise 
plays fast and loose with administrative law doctrine to enable it to give guidance to 
the wider community on substantive law, it risks warping the administrative law 
framework and creating confusion. 
 
Consider Québec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la 
jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc (Bombardier Aerospace Training Center),12 a case that 
                                                 
9 Hernandez Febles v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 SCC 68, [2014] 3 SCR 431. 
 
10 David J Mullan, “2015 Developments in Administrative Law Relevant to Energy Law and Regulation” 
(2016) 4(1) ERQ online 2015 Developments in Administrative Law Relevant to Energy Law and 
Regulation. See e.g. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission) v Canada (AG) 2011 SCC 53, [2011] 3 
SCR 471 though see also the benign interpretation of that decision offered in Canada (AG) v Canadian 
Human Rights Commission 2013 FCA 75 at para 15, [2013] FCJ No 249 (QL), a point to which I will 
return below in Part IV. 
 
11 See the discussion below of Bombardier, infra note 12. See also Mouvement laïque québécois v 
Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16, [2015] 2 SCR 3 [Saguenay]; Paul Daly, “Why Would Jurisdiction Be 
Concurrent? Another Thought on Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC 16” (17 
April 2015) Administrative Law Matters (blog), online: 
<www.administrativelawmatters.com/blog/2015/04/17/why-would-jurisdiction-be-concurrent-another-
thought-on-mouvement-laique-quebecois-v-saguenay-city-2015-scc-16/>.  
 
12 Quebec (Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse) v Bombardier Inc 
(Bombardier Aerospace Training Center), 2015 SCC 39, [2015] 2 SCR 789 [Bombardier]. 
 UNBLJ    RD UN-B  [VOL/TOME 68 
 
 
72 
was resolved decisively in favour of the exposition of national rules of substantive 
and procedural law.  
 
Latif is a pilot who was denied training by Bombardier in 2004. The denial 
was based on a national security decision of the American authorities, a decision 
Bombardier applied because it did not want to imperil its standing with the Federal 
Aviation Authority. Latif is Pakistani. The Quebec Human Rights Tribunal found 
that Bombardier had discriminated against him. Although there was no direct 
evidence of discrimination by Bombardier, the Tribunal based its decision on an 
expert report and circumstantial evidence about racial profiling in the United States 
after 9/11. 
 
At first blush, this looks like a straightforward administrative law case that 
required the Tribunal to weigh evidence and come to a conclusion. Moreover, it 
conducted the weighing exercise in a very particular context, one in which an 
individual like Latif is powerless in the face of an unreviewable decision.13 In this 
sort of context, one can understand why the Tribunal was not especially impressed 
by Bombardier’s automatic application of the American decision and why the 
Tribunal thought Bombardier should have been more proactive.14 As a large 
institution, it was certainly in a better position than Latif to follow up with the U.S. 
authorities. 
 
Why, then, did the Court grant leave? There are two large clues in the joint 
reasons of Wagner and Côté JJ for a unanimous Court.  
 
First, this was the first opportunity for the Court to consider “a form of 
discrimination allegedly arising out of the decision of a foreign authority”.15  
 
Second, the Court had “never clearly enunciated the degree of proof 
associated with the plaintiff’s burden” of making out a prima facie case of 
discrimination.16 Unsurprisingly, the bulk of Wagner and Côté JJ’s reasons are 
devoted to giving administrative decision-makers and lower courts guidance on these 
inter-related issues. The guidance is that the civil standard of the burden of proof 
always applies.17 
 
What about legal pluralism? Wagner and Côté JJ accept that tribunals have 
the authority to adapt their rules of procedure and admissibility of evidence to their 
                                                 
13 Ibid at para16. 
 
14 Ibid at para101 
 
15 Ibid at para 2. 
 
16 Ibid at para 55. 
 
17 Ibid at para 65, though note that strictly speaking this conclusion only applies to Quebec, which has a 
specific legislative provision about the burden of proof. 
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particular regulatory context.18 But not the burden of proof, “in order to maintain the 
uniformity, integrity and predictability of the law”.19 It is difficult see a justification 
here for according the burden of proof a special status different to rules of procedure 
and evidence. Wagner and Côté JJ say only “that the application of a given legal test 
must be based on the same elements and the same degree of proof in every case”,20 
but this is difficult to square with the Court’s openness to allowing administrative 
decision-makers to mould rules of substantive law to better achieve their regulatory 
purposes. As Fish J put it in Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc. v Manitoba 
Association of Health Care Professionals, an administrative decision-maker “may 
properly develop doctrines and fashion remedies appropriate in their field, drawing 
inspiration from general legal principles, the objectives and purposes of the statutory 
scheme” and other contextual considerations.21 Hopefully future reviewing courts 
will focus on the language highlighting the effective reversal of the burden of proof, 
because this is the sort of error that superior courts can more plausibly claim they 
have authority to correct on judicial review. 
 
There then follows an intrusive analysis of the Tribunal’s appreciation of 
the facts, which looks suspiciously like de novo review even though it is adorned by 
the language of reasonableness.22 At one point, Wagner and Côté JJ comment that 
the “practical” effect of the Tribunal’s decision was to reverse the burden of proof 
they had previously established,23 but in their analysis they carefully pick apart the 
Tribunal’s reasons, using different expressions: insufficient evidence,24 evidence not 
“tangibly related”,25 evidence “not sufficiently related”,26 or simply “no evidence”.27 
But whether the evidence is adequate or not is a matter for the administrative 
decision-maker. As has been said many times, it is emphatically not “the function of 
the reviewing court to reweigh the evidence”.28  
 
Further, the evidence was insufficient on only one of the three grounds Latif 
needed to prove to make out a prima facie case of discrimination — does this mean 
that a reviewing court is entitled to pick apart a human rights tribunal’s decision and 
                                                 
18 Ibid at paras 67–68. 
 
19 Ibid at para 69. 
 
20 Ibid at para 69. 
 
21 Nor-Man Regional Health Authority Inc v Manitoba Association of Health Care Professionals, 2011 
SCC 59 at para 45, [2011] 3 SCR 616. 
 
22 Bombardier, supra note 12 at para 81. 
 
23 Ibid at para 88. 
 
24 Ibid at para 84. 
 
25 Ibid at para 89. 
 
26 Ibid at para 89. 
 
27 Ibid at para 99. 
 
28 Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, 2009 SCC 12 at para 60, [2009] 1 SCR 339 [Khosa]. 
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examine the sufficiency of the evidence on each ground independently? We have 
been told, however, that judicial review is not a “line-by-line treasure hunt for 
error”.29 
 
Inasmuch as there is any meaningful guidance to lower courts here about 
the general principles of administrative law, the unfortunate effect would be to 
license intrusive judicial review of tribunals’ appreciation of the facts. In my view, 
Bombardier should be treated primarily as a case about discrimination law. If the 
Court’s goal was — as I suggested — to set out general principles relating to the 
burden of proof in discrimination cases, Wagner and Côté JJ’s reasons surely 
achieved it; it was a strong signal to lower courts and administrative tribunals about 
how to proceed in discrimination cases. But as far as administrative law is 
concerned, its comments on the standard of proof applied by the decision-maker and 
its close review of the evidence constitute noise that future courts should tune out. To 
put the point in the terms the Court employed in Henry, the “wider circle of analysis” 
in Bombardier is authoritative only as to the substantive law of employment 
discrimination, not as to the general principles of administrative law.  
 
 
III. Sorting Signal from Noise 
 
How do the rest of us know when the Court is telling us something about judicial 
review principles and when it is not? Should lower courts, lawyers and litigants try to 
integrate all of the Court’s judicial-review jurisprudence into their analytical 
frameworks or should they be selective?  
 
In general, where the Court expressly sets out to give authoritative guidance 
on the general principles of administrative law its decisions should be closely parsed 
by administrative lawyers. But the rest, with respect, is “noise” as far as 
administrative law is concerned. These cases are characterized by purely pro forma 
references to correctness and reasonableness, an absence of detailed discussion of the 
general principles of standard of review and lengthy explanations of substantive law 
designed to guide lower courts.  
 
This last characteristic is important. I am not saying that these cases should 
be ignored, but that they should be treated as authoritative only in respect of the 
particular area of substantive law they address. What is “noise” to someone 
interested in the general principles of judicial review may be a very strong “signal” 
to someone interested in, say, access-to-information law, or human-rights law. From 
the perspective of the general administrative lawyer, the distinction between “signal” 
and “noise” will be viewed differently and many cases of interest to others will have 
to be discarded. 
 
                                                 
29 Communications, Energy and Paperworkers Union of Canada, Local 30 v Irving Pulp & Paper, Ltd, 
2013 SCC 34 at para 54, [2013] 2 SCR 458. 
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There are several well-known examples of cases in which the Court has 
explicitly sent signals about administrative law: CUPE v New Brunswick Liquor 
Corporation;30 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration);31 
and, most recently, Dunsmuir v New Brunswick.32 These examples are 
straightforward, however. What is necessary is a set of criteria for identifying other 
cases that send important signals.  
 
 
Extent of Treatment of an Issue 
 
First, the Court may give greater or lesser treatment in its reasons to a particular 
issue. 
 
An easy example is Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board).33 This was an unexceptional case 
about the calculation of vacation benefits by a labour arbitrator.  
 
But Abella J began the judgment of the Court by referencing the 
“transformative” Dunsmuir decision, in which the Court had said that the “purpose 
of reasons, when they are required, is to demonstrate “justification, transparency and 
intelligibility””.34 She then set out the issues for resolution: “whether the arbitrator’s 
reasons in this case satisfied these criteria and whether the reasons engaged 
procedural fairness”.35 Most of her reasons focused not on the facts of the case but on 
the general principles of administrative law. 
 
She began by laying out “the context for understanding what the Court 
meant in Dunsmuir when it called for “justification, transparency and 
intelligibility””.36 She explained that Dunsmuir was not authority “for the 
proposition that the “adequacy” of reasons is a stand-alone basis for quashing a 
decision, or as advocating that a reviewing court undertake two discrete analyses — 
one for the reasons and a separate one for the result”.37 She also rejected the 
suggestion that “alleged deficiencies or flaws in the reasons fall under the category 
of a breach of the duty of procedural fairness and that they are subject to a 
                                                 
30 CUPE v New Brunswick Liquor Corporation, [1979] 2 SCR 227, 25 NBR (2d) 237. 
 
31 Pushpanathan v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [1998] 1 SCR 982, 160 DLR (4th) 
193 [Pushpanathan]. 
 
32 Dunsmuir, supra note 1. 
 
33 Newfoundland and Labrador Nurses' Union v Newfoundland and Labrador (Treasury Board), 2011 
SCC 62, [2011] 3 SCR 708 [Newfoundland Nurses]. 
 
34 Ibid at para 1, citing Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 47. 
 
35 Ibid at para 1. 
 
36 Ibid at para 13.  
 
37 Ibid at para 14.  
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correctness review”.38 And she laid down a general rule: “if the reasons allow the 
reviewing court to understand why the tribunal made its decision and permit it to 
determine whether the conclusion is within the range of acceptable outcomes, the 
Dunsmuir criteria are met”.39  
 
Newfoundland Nurses thus sent an important signal to lower courts 
(something that was especially important given that some provincial appellate courts 
had seen the references to “justification, intelligibility and transparency” as inviting 
close scrutiny of the reasons given for administrative decisions).40 
 
I should not be understood as saying that Newfoundland Nurses must 
therefore be read like a statute. To do so would be contrary to the Court’s express 
admonition in Henry. In addition, Newfoundland Nurses has to be read with other 
important decisions of the Court. In particular, in Alberta (Information and Privacy 
Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association,41 decided the previous day, 
Rothstein J in his majority reasons had specified that the direction that courts are to 
give respectful attention to the reasons “which could be offered in support of a 
decision”42 is not a “carte blanche to reformulate a tribunal’s decision in a way that 
casts aside an unreasonable chain of analysis in favour of the court’s own rationale 
for the result”.43 It will be necessary in some situations to engage in a classical 
common law analysis which seeks to reconcile these two decisions.44 But there can 
surely be little doubt that Newfoundland Nurses sent a signal. 
 
Conversely, cursory treatment of an issue may indicate that the Court’s 
views on a particular point should be considered to be noise. In Agraira v Canada 
(Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness)45 the underlying issue for decision – 
the meaning to be given to “national interest” in the context of one of the Minister’s 
discretionary powers – had been certified as a general question of law by the Federal 
Court for resolution by the Federal Court of Appeal. One might reasonably think that 
                                                 
38 Ibid at para 21. 
 
39 Ibid at para 16. 
 
40 See e.g. Clifford v Ontario Municipal Employees Retirement System, 2009 ONCA 670, (2009) 98 OR 
(3d) 210. 
 
41 Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v Alberta Teachers' Association, 2011 SCC 61, 
[2011] 3 SCR 654 [Alberta Teachers]. 
 
42 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 48, citing David Dyzenhaus, “The Politics of Deference: Judicial 
Review and Democracy”, in Michael Taggart, ed, The Province of Administrative Law (Oxford: Hart 
Publishing, 1997) 279 at 286. 
 
43 Alberta Teachers, supra note 41 at para 54, citing Petro-Canada v Workers’ Compensation Board (BC), 
2009 BCCA 396, 276 BCAC 135, at paras 53 and 56. 
 
44 See Lemus v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 114, 372 DLR (4th) 567. 
 
45 Agraira v Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2013 SCC 36, [2013] 2 SCR 559 
[Agraira]. 
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this would have been a strong indication that the correctness standard should apply.46  
But LeBel J simply said, “the standard of review applicable in the case at bar has 
been satisfactorily determined in past decisions to be reasonableness”.47 
 
In a subsequent case, the Federal Court of Appeal refused to follow Agraira 
on this point, because it appeared “to depart inexplicably from earlier Supreme Court 
of Canada jurisprudence”, essentially treating it as noise.48 Instead, the Federal Court 
of Appeal would continue “its practice of providing the definitive answer to a 
certified question on a point of statutory interpretation”.49 As a result, the issue had 
to be resolved expressly by the Court in favour of the Agraira approach. In 
Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), the Court gave explicit 
reasons that constituted a clear signal as to the Court’s view of the general principles 
of judicial review, viz. that the presumption of deferential review of a decision-
maker’s interpretations of its home statute is not rebutted by the presence of an 
appeal clause.50 
 
Sometimes, a decision of the Court can contain some signal and some noise. 
Consider, in this respect, McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission).51  
On the one hand, Moldaver J gave a lengthy exposition of the meaning of the other 
operative part of paragraph 47 of Dunsmuir, namely the injunction that an 
administrative decision must fall “within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes 
which are defensible in respect of the facts and law”.  
 
Moldaver J explained the implications of this injunction for the review of 
administrative interpretations of statutory provisions: “because legislatures do not 
always speak clearly and because the tools of statutory interpretation do not always 
guarantee a single clear answer, legislative provisions will on occasion be 
susceptible to multiple reasonable interpretations”,52 in which case “the resolution of 
unclear language in an administrative decision maker’s home statute is usually best 
left to the decision maker…because the choice between multiple reasonable 
interpretations will often involve policy considerations that we presume the 
legislature desired the administrative decision maker — not the courts — to make”.53 
In some cases, however, “[w]here the ordinary tools of statutory interpretation lead 
                                                 
46 See Pushpanathan, supra note 31, though see also Baker v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and 
Immigration), [1999] 2 SCR 817, 174 DLR (4th) 193. 
 
47 Agraira, supra note 45 at para 49. 
 
48 Kanthasamy v Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FCA 113 at para 30, [2014] 1 FCR 335 
[Kanthasamy]. 
 
49 Ibid at para 35. 
 
50 Agraira, supra note 45 at paras 42–44. 
 
51 McLean v British Columbia (Securities Commission), 2013 SCC 67, [2013] 3 SCR 895 [McLean]. 
 
52 Ibid at para 32. 
 
53 Ibid at para 33 [emphasis in original].  
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to a single reasonable interpretation”, the range of reasonable outcomes “will 
necessarily be limited to a single reasonable interpretation — and the administrative 
decision maker must adopt it”.54 This was a clear signal about how to address 
questions of statutory interpretation under paragraph 47 of Dunsmuir. 
 
On the other hand, Moldaver J dealt summarily with the question of 
whether deference could be accorded to the Commission’s choice between the 
competing possible reasonable interpretations of the statutory provision that was at 
issue. The British Columbia Court of Appeal considered it “impossible” to review 
the interpretation,55 but Moldaver J was satisfied that “a basis for the Commission’s 
interpretation is apparent from the arguments advanced by the respondent”.56 Does 
this mean that the reasons to which a reviewing court must pay “respectful 
attention”57 include those advanced in argument by counsel for an administrative 
decision-maker? This is a troubling proposition,58 the potential wider impact of 
which Moldaver J did not seem to consider. It would be better, then, for lower courts 
to consider this aspect of McLean to constitute noise. 
 
 
Concurring and Dissenting Reasons  
 
Second, the presence of concurring and dissenting reasons as to a majority 
judgment’s treatment of the general principles of administrative law will suggest that 
a decision should be treated as signal rather than noise. Concurring and dissenting 
reasons tend to concentrate attention on particular points of dispute that might 
otherwise be obfuscated by a bland set of majority reasons.59  
 
For instance, the presence of a lengthy and detailed dissent by Fish J in 
Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v Khosa, in which he would have quashed the 
decision of the Immigration Appeal Division for giving too much weight to Mr. 
Khosa’s lack of remorse for engaging in street racing gives additional heft to the 
holding of the majority that reviewing courts should not reweigh the evidence 
considered by an administrative decision-maker.60 That the point was raised by the 
dissent and decided without equivocation by the majority made it a clear signal about 
the general principles of administrative law. 
 
                                                 
54 Ibid at para 38. 
 
55 British Columbia (Securities Commission) v McLean, 2011 BCCA 455 at para 30, 343 DLR (4th) 432. 
 
56 McLean, supra note 51 at para 72. 
 
57 Dunsmuir, supra note 1 at para 48, citing Dyzenhaus, supra note 42 at 286. 
 
58 See further Paul Daly, “The Scope and Meaning of Reasonableness Review” (2015) 52 Alta L Rev 799 
at 815–817. 
 
59 See generally James Lee, “A Defence of Concurring Speeches” (2009) Pub L 305. 
 
60 Khosa, supra note 28 at para 59.  
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This was reinforced by Alberta Teachers’, in which the majority expressly 
rejected Binnie J’s suggestion in his concurring reasons that there ought to be 
variable degrees of deference within the reasonableness standard set out in paragraph 
47 of Dunsmuir. Similarly, Cromwell J’s reluctance in his concurring reasons in 
Alberta Teachers’ to countenance the abolition of “true jurisdictional questions” as a 
category of question attracting correctness review61 underscored that the majority’s 
insistence that this category has to be extremely narrowly construed was a clear 
signal to lower courts. Finally, the refusal of the majority in Edmonton East 
(Capilano) Shopping Centres v Edmonton (City) to revise the administrative law 
principles concerning the application of the presumption of reasonableness review 
even to a statutory framework containing an appeal clause was, in view of the 
strident dissent on this point, a clear signal of the scope of deference.62 
 
 
Consideration of Lower Court Decisions 
 
Third, detailed consideration of lower court decisions will indicate that a decision 
contains important signals about administrative law.  
 
Directly at issue in Mouvement laïque québécois v Saguenay (City)63 was a 
decision of Quebec’s Human Rights Tribunal about whether the recitation of a 
prayer before municipal meetings (allied to the presence of religious symbols) 
amounted to discriminatory treatment of an atheist who attended the meetings. 
Indirectly at issue was whether a statutory appeal clause could pre-empt the general 
principles of administrative law; does the standard of review analysis apply in all 
cases, even if a statute creates a very broad right of appeal? 
 
Decisions of the Tribunal are appealable, with leave, directly to the Quebec 
Court of Appeal.64 The relevant statute also provides that the general rules governing 
appeals are to apply in this context. The Quebec Court of Appeal had split previously 
on the proper interpretation of its role on appeal from the Tribunal: some judges 
applied judicial review criteria (following the well-established rule that appeal 
clauses do not eliminate deference to specialized tribunals) but some applied 
appellate criteria based on the apparently plain language of the statute and the 
evident goal of giving the Quebec Court of Appeal a gatekeeping power by limiting 
appeals to those raising questions of general law.65 
 
                                                 
61 See especially Alberta Teachers, supra note 41 at paras 102–103 and see also Lauren Wihak, “Whither 
the Correctness Standard of Review: Dunsmuir Six Years Later” (2014) 27 Can J Admin L & Prac 174. 
 
62 Edmonton East (Capilano) Shopping Centres v Edmonton (City), 2016 SCC 47, [2016] 2 SCR 293. 
 
63 Saguenay, supra note 11. 
 
64 Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, CQLR c C-12, ss 132–133. 
 
65 Saguenay, supra note 11 at paras 31–37. 
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Having set out the conflicting approaches at some length, Gascon J came to 
a firm conclusion based on a comprehensive review of the authorities: “Where a 
court reviews a decision of a specialized administrative tribunal, the standard of 
review must be determined on the basis of administrative law principles…regardless 
of whether the review is conducted in the context of an application for judicial 
review or of a statutory appeal”.66  
 
He acknowledged that “the scope of a right to appeal and the absence of 
exclusive jurisdiction may sometimes affect the deference to be shown to decisions 
of a specialized administrative tribunal” but held nonetheless that these features of a 
regulatory scheme would “not justify replacing the standards of review applicable to 
judicial review with the appellate standard”.67  
 
Given the lengthy treatment of the conflicting approaches in the court below 
and the consideration of relevant authority, Saguenay sends a very clear signal about 
the relationship between appeal clauses and the standard of review framework, viz. 
that language creating a statutory appeal never pre-empts administrative law 
principles (a point recently underscored again by Edmonton East).68 
 
 
Consistency of Treatment 
 
Fourth, a decision which is out of line with other decisions on the general principles 
of administrative law is more likely to be noise than signal. Bombardier is an 
example, especially on the question whether reviewing courts can reweigh the 
evidence considered by an administrative decision-maker: one would scour the post-
Dunsmuir Supreme Court Reports in vain for any indication that reweighing is a 
permissible activity for reviewing courts.  
 
Another example might be the uncertainty created by Katz Group Canada 
Inc v Ontario (Health and Long‑Term Care)69 about the scope of the Dunsmuir 
framework. At issue in Katz was the validity of a set of regulations imposed by a 
provincial cabinet on the sale of generic medication. Abella J made no attempt to 
situate judicial review of regulations in the Dunsmuir framework, preferring instead 
to rely on 1980s authority on judicial review of regulations.70 This was an odd 
                                                 
66 Ibid at para 38. 
 
67 Ibid at para 43. 
 
68 See also Kanthasamy, supra note 48. Interestingly, the only other post-Dunsmuir case in which the 
standard of review analysis has been applied by the Court to a statute containing a leave provision was 
Bell Canada v Bell Aliant Regional Communications, 2009 SCC 40, [2009] 2 SCR 764. Readers will not 
be surprised to learn that the Court paid no attention to the existence of an appeal clause containing a leave 
provision. 
 
69 Katz Group Canada Inc v Ontario (Health and Long‑Term Care), 2013 SCC 64, [2013] 3 SCR 810. 
 
70 Thorne’s Hardware Ltd v The Queen, [1983] 1 SCR 106, 143 DLR (3d) 577. 
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outcome, because the Court had invariably in the post-Dunsmuir era applied the 
Dunsmuir framework in administrative law cases. 
 
Subsequently, in Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (AG), Rothstein 
J denied that Katz cast any doubt on the general applicability of the Dunsmuir 
framework, characterizing it is a case limited to a challenge to the vires of 
regulations issued by a body (and, one might add, an elected body) acting in a 
“legislative capacity”.71 Similarly, in Green v Law Society of Manitoba,72 the 
standard of review framework was applied to the question whether rules imposing a 
mandatory continuing professional development requirement were within the Law 
Society’s statutory mandate;73 Katz was treated as an application of the framework to 
regulations.74  Given that Katz is inconsistent with the rest of the Court’s post-
Dunsmuir jurisprudence, it must be considered to have been a noise – not a signal – 
about the general principles of administrative law. The better view is that Dunsmuir 
provides the framework for judicial review of all administrative decision-makers.75 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
One way of addressing the problem of distinguishing the signal from the noise in the 
Court’s administrative law cases is to develop criteria along the lines of those I have 
laid out above. My list of criteria is not exhaustive; the distinction between signal 
and noise will not always be an easy one to make and will typically require lawyerly 
judgement, just as sorting ratio from obiter has never been a purely mechanical 
exercise.  
 
To anticipate potential objections, I do not think that my distinction 
between “signal” and “noise” is an incitement to illegitimate judicial disobedience to 
binding commands issued by the Court. To reiterate the Court’s own statements in 
Henry, to think of a “a strict and tidy demarcation” between ratio and obiter is an 
“oversimplification”.76 For the administrative lawyer, the “noise” cases are limited to 
their particular facts, but the “signal” cases involve commentary that is part of “a 
wider circle of analysis which is obviously intended for guidance and which should 
be accepted as authoritative”.77  
                                                 
71 Canadian National Railway Co v Canada (AG), 2014 SCC 40 at para 51, [2014] 2 SCR 135. 
 
72 Green v Law Society of Manitoba, 2017 SCC 20. 
 
73 Ibid at para 19. 
 
74 Ibid at paras 20 and 67. 
 
75 Though it is worth noting that the British Columbia Court of Appeal has applied Katz rather than 
Dunsmuir to a regulation adopted by an unelected regulatory body: Sobeys West Inc v College of 
Pharmacists of British Columbia, 2016 BCCA 41, 97 Admin L Rev (5th) 35. 
 
76 Henry, supra note 3 at para 52. 
 
77 Ibid at para 57. 
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If the Court’s decisions continue to sow confusion by resolving individual 
cases in ways that are inconsistent with the general principles of judicial review, 
administrative lawyers will have to develop analytical tools that permit them to 
distinguish the important cases from the unimportant cases, the signal from the noise. 
 
 
IV. Reasonableness and the Court’s Institutional Role 
 
However, the Court’s decisions need not sow confusion. There is an alternative 
approach, which would permit the Court to set out general guidance about 
substantive areas of law in a way consistent with its institutional role at the apex of 
the Canadian legal system without causing confusion about the operation of the 
principles of administrative law.  
 
The alternative approach is for the Court to abolish the standard of 
correctness and subject administrative decisions to reasonableness review in all 
cases. There is academic78 and extra-judicial79 support for this approach, which has 
recently received the cautious imprimatur of Abella J. 
 
In her partially concurring reasons in Tervita Corp v Canada 
(Commissioner of Competition), she confessed to finding it “increasingly difficult to 
discern the demarcations between a reasonableness and correctness analysis” and 
even floated the possibility that the demarcations could be “completely erased” at 
some point in the future.80 
 
What was implicit in Tervita recently became explicit in Wilson v Atomic 
Energy of Canada Ltd.81 Abella J’s reasons were notable for her forthright 
suggestion that the Court ought to consider collapsing correctness and 
reasonableness into a single reasonableness standard, the “most obvious and 
frequently proposed reform of the current system”.82 She set up the question as 
follows: “whether we need two different names for our approaches to judicial 
review, or whether both approaches can live comfortably under a more broadly 
conceived understanding of reasonableness”.83 She also highlighted the key 
advantage of a general reasonableness standard, that it is flexible enough to allow “a 
wider range for those kinds of issues and decision-makers traditionally given a 
                                                 
78 See e.g. Paul Daly, “Struggling Towards Coherence in Canadian Administrative Law? Recent Cases on 
Standard of Review and Reasonableness” (2016) 62 McGill LJ (forthcoming) [Daly, “Struggling Towards 
Coherence”]. 
 
79 See The Honourable Justice David Stratas, “The Canadian Law of Judicial Review: A Plea for Doctrinal 
Coherence and Consistency” (2016) 42 Queen’s LJ 27. 
 
80 Tervita Corp v Canada (Commissioner of Competition), 2015 SCC 3 at para 171, [2015] 1 SCR 161. 
 
81 Wilson v Atomic Energy of Canada Ltd, 2016 SCC 29, [2016] 1 SCR 770 [Wilson]. 
 
82 Ibid at para 28. 
 
83 Ibid at para 24. 
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measure of deference, and a narrow one of only one ‘defensible’ outcome for those 
which formerly attracted a correctness review”.84 
 
It is this flexibility that makes the reasonableness standard of such utility in 
responding to the signal and noise problem created by the Court’s recent judgments 
in the area of administrative law. 
 
Dunsmuir’s reasonableness standard, with its twin references to 
“justification, intelligibility and transparency” and a “range of possible, acceptable 
outcomes”,85 has been refined over the years. It now seems clear that most of the 
analytical burden has been assumed by the concept of a “range of reasonable 
outcomes”,86 with the “justification, intelligibility and transparency” requirement 
satisfied by a decision that is “clearly understand[able]” to a reviewing court.87 
 
Reasonableness “takes its colour from its context”.88 The “range will 
necessarily vary”.89 It “must be assessed in the context of the particular type of 
decision making involved and all relevant factors”.90  
 
Of particular interest in the present context is the role of legal principles in 
narrowing the range of reasonable outcomes.  
 
In Catalyst Paper, McLachlin CJ noted that range of reasonable outcomes 
may be “circumscribed” by reference to “the rationale of the statutory regime”.91  
 
Similarly, in Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and 
Communities) v Jagjit Singh Farwaha Stratas JA explained that, in some cases 
“Parliament may have constrained the decision-maker’s discretion by specifying a 
recipe of factors to be considered – all things being equal, this narrows the range of 
options the decision-maker legitimately has”.92 An excellent illustration of this 
principle is the Court’s acknowledgement in McLean that, sometimes, the range of 
reasonable outcomes will be so narrow as to admit of only one outcome. 
                                                 
84 Ibid at para 33. 
 
85 Ibid at para 47. 
 
86 Khosa, supra note 28 at para 67. 
 
87 Agraira, supra note 45 at para 89.  
 
88 Khosa, supra note 28 at para 59. 
 
89 Wilson, supra note 81 at para 22. 
 
90 Catalyst Paper Corp v North Cowichan (District) 2012 SCC 2 at para 18, [2012] 1 SCR 5 [Catalyst 
Paper]. 
 
91 Ibid at para 25. 
 
92 Canada (Minister of Transport, Infrastructure and Communities) v Jagjit Singh Farwaha, 2014 FCA 56 
at para 91, [2014] 2 FCR 1006. 
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In addition, prior judicial decisions on matters subsequently considered by 
an administrative tribunal will also tend to narrow the range of reasonable 
outcomes.93 
 
And in Canada (AG) v Igloo Vikski Inc, albeit in dissent, Côté J took the 
view that the range of reasonable interpretations of a tariff schedule was constrained 
by the need to provide an answer consistent with Canada’s international obligations 
in respect of tariff harmonization.94 
 
It has thus been said that “[l]egal matters, as opposed to factual or policy 
matters, admit of fewer possible, acceptable outcomes”.95 In most cases, this is likely 
to be true. 
The insight that the more legal in nature a question is the narrower the range of 
reasonable outcomes will be is significant because it allows us to appreciate how the 
Court might send signals about individual cases for the benefit of the environmental, 
immigration and workers’ compensation lawyers without creating too much noise for 
the administrative lawyers. 
 
Very simply put, by demonstrating that the range of reasonable outcomes is 
constrained by statutory language, pre-existing jurisprudence and so on, the Court 
can provide a significant degree of structure to areas of substantive law. Without 
necessarily substituting judgment as it would by applying correctness (or “disguised 
correctness”) review, it can indicate that administrative decision-makers have, 
relatively speaking, a narrower margin of interpretation in some areas than in others. 
Although I think that the move to a unified reasonableness standard is the most 
rational next step in Canadian administrative law, I have significant reservations 
about a one-size-fits-all reasonableness standard. For one thing, applying the concept 
of a range of reasonable outcomes risks reintroducing distinctions between questions 
of law and questions of policy, fact and discretion.96 For another thing, permitting 
reviewing courts to define the range of reasonable outcomes in respect of a particular 
factual and legal matrix will allow judges to confine administrative decision-makers 
within strict limits.97  
 
It would be better in my view for any “range” to be established by reference 
to the statute as a whole rather than to a particular statutory provision; departure 
from a line of previous cases, judicial authority or the natural meaning of a statute 
                                                 
93 Canada (AG) v Canadian Human Rights Commission, 2013 FCA 75 at paras 16 and 18, [2013] FCJ No 
249 (QL). 
 
94 Canada (AG) v Igloo Vikski Inc, 2016 SCC 38 at para 58, [2016] 2 SCR 80. 
 
95 Canada (AG) v Abraham, 2012 FCA 266 at para 45, [2012] FCJ No 1324 (QL). 
 
96 See Paul Daly, “Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” (2014) 66 SCLR (2d) 233. 
 
97 See Paul Daly, “The Struggle for Deference in Canada” in Hanna Wilberg & Mark Elliott, eds, The 
Scope and Intensity of Substantive Review: Traversing Taggart’s Rainbow (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2015). 
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would constitute indicia of unreasonableness that may justify judicial intervention.98 
Nonetheless, adopting the range of reasonable outcomes concept is the most rational 
next step in the development of Canadian administrative law, though judges ought to 
apply it with due regard to the decisional autonomy accorded by the legislature to the 
administrative decision-maker under review.99  
 
As Iacobucci J explained in Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, the 
analytical structure of reasonableness review provides some safeguards against 
judicial intrusion on administrative decision-makers’ autonomy: “Applying the 
standard of reasonableness gives effect to the legislative intention that a specialized 
body will have the primary responsibility of deciding the issue according to its own 
process and for its own reasons”.100 At no point should the reviewing court “ask 
itself what the correct decision would have been”,101 because even “if there could be, 
notionally, a single best answer, it is not the court’s role to seek this out when 
deciding if the decision was unreasonable”.102  
 
It is thus inappropriate for a reviewing court to set up a benchmark based on 
its independent view of the legal and factual matrix, because “any departure from the 
reviewing court’s hypothetical decision is bound to appear unreasonable”.103 Rather, 
a reviewing court should start from the decision and work outwards, identifying 
“badges of unreasonableness” that cannot be cogently explained by the decision-
maker and, as a result, bring the decision outside the range of reasonable 
outcomes.104 
 
Applying this methodology to Bombardier, Wagner and Côté JJ could have 
begun with the Tribunal’s decision and gone on to lay out the conventional burden of 
proof in discrimination cases, as well as the undisputed elements of discriminatory 
treatment. This would have permitted them to give general guidance to the legal 
community on the appropriate approach administrative decision-makers should 
follow in discrimination cases. A departure from the undisputed framework for 
discrimination cases would have been a badge of unreasonableness.  
 
However, Wagner and Côté JJ could then have emphasized that the 
Tribunal, in the unique factual circumstances before it, had provided cogent reasons 
for its modification of the burden of proof (or reasons that were insufficiently cogent, 
as the case may be). In this way, Wagner and Côté JJ could have given general 
                                                 
98 See Paul Daly, “Unreasonable Interpretations of Law” (2014) 66 SCLR (2d) 233. 
 
99 See Daly, “Struggling Towards Coherence”, supra note 78. 
 
100 Law Society of New Brunswick v Ryan, 2003 SCC 20 at para 50, [2003] 1 SCR 247. 
 
101 Ibid.  
 
102 Ibid at para 51. 
 
103 Ottawa Police Services v Diafwila, 2016 ONCA 627 at para 66, 270 ACWS (3d) 205. 
 
104 Delios v Canada (AG), 2015 FCA 117 at para 27, [2015] FCJ No 549 (QL). 
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guidance on discrimination law without causing confusion about the operation of the 
general principles of administrative law. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The institutional context in which the Court operates puts pressure on it to provide 
general guidance on issues of substantive law. Where such issues are first resolved 
by administrative decision-makers and addressed by the Court only on judicial 
review, however, the general principles of administrative law may be perceived as 
inhibiting the Court’s ability to provide general guidance. Unfortunately, the Court 
has in recent decisions prioritized the giving of general guidance over the sound 
operation of the principles of administrative law.  
 
Accordingly, administrative lawyers need to be able to distinguish between 
the signal and the noise, between those decisions of the Court that are designed to 
structure the administrative law framework (“signal”) and those that are designed to 
resolve pressing issues of substantive law (“noise” – at least as far as administrative 
lawyers are concerned).  
 
Alternatively, however, the Court could take up academic, extra-judicial 
and now judicial suggestions to adopt a unified reasonableness standard of review. 
By setting the “range” of reasonable outcomes and rigorously following the well-
established analytical structure of reasonableness review, the Court could send 
signals about substantive areas of law without creating unnecessary noise in the 
operation of the principles of judicial review. Noise and signal would merge in the 
comforting hum of reasonableness review.  
  
 
 
